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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE REGIME OF THE
SEA IN MISSISSIPPI'S COASTAL ZONE-
by
James H. Wolfe*
The State of Mississippi enjoys an opportunity for un-
paralleled economic growth, and its coastal zone provides a
geographical basis for this developmental potential. The
careful management of coastal zone resources in this period
of industrial expansion requires a close and effective working
relationship between federal and state authorities, yet unre-
solved legal issues inhibit the unfolding of the necessary pat-
tern of cooperation. Principal among these points of law are
two questions: What is the lawful starting point or baseline
from which to measure breadth of Mississippi's territorial
sea? Once this point has been ascertained, how then will the
lateral seaward boundary dividing the Gulf of Mexico's
seabed between Mississippi and Louisiana be delimited?
Principles of international law derived from treaties, court
decisions, and precedent established in the practice of other
countries govern the delimitation of maritime boundaries.
The purpose of this article is to illustrate the relationship
between international law and national policy as exemplified
by a case study of Mississippi's coastal zone.
Territorial Sea
Whether or not the State of Mississippi possesses juris-
diction over the Mississippi Sound and the resources beneath
it depends upon which standard is applied by the United
States in measuring the breadth of its territorial sea-those
adjacent waters encompassed by the sovereign authority of a
coastal state. In a letter dated November 8, 1793, to the min-
ister of France, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson re-
viewed the traditional rules for defining the territorial sea
and concluded that, for the time being, the United States
would acknowledge the validity of the three-mile rule, and
therefore would exercise sovereignty over a belt of coastal
*B.A. 1955, Harvard College; M.A. 1958, University of Connecticut; Ph.D. 1962,
University of Maryland. Professor of Political Science, University of Southern Mis-
sissippi.
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waters having a breadth of three nautical miles.' A contem-
porary survey prepared by the Department of State reveals
that of sixty-three sovereign states with maritime frontiers
only the United States and Great Britain, among the major
sea powers, adhere to the eighteenth-century standard of
three miles.2 Unlike those few governments upholding this
historic standard of limited sovereign jurisdiction over coast-
al waters (e.g., Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zea-
land) the United States opts to measure its territorial sea
from a normal or natural baseline following the sinuosities
of the coastline. By contrast, other maritime powers draw
straight baselines following the general direction of their
coasts and then proceed to compute their territorial seas
from this point. For example, the British government has es-
tablished, as of September 25, 1964, a series of straight base-
lines enclosing the islands off the western coast of Scotland
and providing a starting point from which to delimit the al-
lotted three miles.3 As a result, Great Britain's territorial sea
with respect to Scotland is considerably greater than the ap-
plication of the historic rule would suggest.
During the First United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS I, 1958) the United States' representa-
tive, Arthur Dean, stated that his government continued to
recognize the three-mile limit.' This policy reflected the stra-
tegic concerns of naval planners over the possible enclosure
of the seas and the resultant interdiction of fleet movements
and maritime commerce through vital straits. The brief air
battle between American and Libyan aircraft over the Gulf
of Sidra (August 19, 1981) is indicative of the outcome of ef-
forts to lay extravagant claims to coastal waters. In this case
naval power served to curb the expansionist designs of the
1. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS 183 (1833). The term "mile"
used here and throughout this article refers to a nautical or geographical mile of
6,076 feet or 1,852 meters. The purported range of eighteenth-century cannon fire
was three miles, and custom ordained that this distance would be the limit of the
territorial sea.
2. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No 36: NATIONAL CLAIMS OF MARITIME
JURISDICTION (rev. 2d ed. 1974); NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE
LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. DOC. ST/LEG SER.B/16, 18, 19 (1974-78).
3. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 23: STRAIGHT BASELINES-UNITED
KINGDOM (1970).
4. 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA at 108, UN. Doc. A/CONF. 13/39 (1958).
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Libyan government, but the nonviolent invocation of recog-
nized rules of international law would benefit the entire in-
ternational community.
The diplomatic structure created to facilitate the pro-
cess of international legal codification is a series of confer-
ences on the law of the sea sponsored by the United Nations.
In these fora, as Ambassador Dean's statement reveals, con-
siderations of foreign policy and national security take prece-
dence over the need to formulate positive law, and as a re-
sult, universal understandings are often difficult to forge.
The Second United Nations Conference of the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS II, 1960) produced no agreement, yet an in-
creasing number of governments were advocating the adop-
tion of a rule of six or even twelve miles as opposed to the
Jeffersonian standard of three miles. The Third Conference
(UNCLOS III) opened on December 3, 1973, and is still in ses-
sion. Its protracted deliberations do reflect a growing inter-
national consensus in favor of recognizing by treaty a terri-
torial sea twelve miles in breadth. The forty-six governments
whose representatives participate in the Conference's general
committee have contributed to the formulation of a Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea (as released on September
2, 1980)1 which provides that "[e]very State has the right to
establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not
exceeding twelve nautical miles, measured from baselines de-
termined in accordance with this Convention. '
Testimony given in 1981 before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs by the representatives of the Carter and
Reagan administrations to UNCLOS III identified the few re-
maining objections to the Draft Convention as principally
those concerned with the mining of minerals on the deep
seabed.7 The proposed twelve-mile limit was not an issue.
Were the Draft Convention to be signed and ratified by the
United States, as is anticipated, the implementation of Arti-
5. OFFICIAL REcoRDs OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA: INFORMAL COMPOSITE NEGOTIATING TEXT, U.N. DOc. A/CONF. 62/W?
10/REV. 3 (1980).
6. Id. at 2.
7. United States Policy and the Third United Nations Coferewe on the Law of
the Sea Hearings Before the House Comm on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
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cle III would expand Mississippi's maritime jurisdiction
southward from three miles to twelve miles, and Louisiana's
seaward boundary would advance eastward into the Gulf of
Mexico by the same distance. The resultant overlapping
claims will certainly engender new litigation between the two
states. While the revised Convention on the Law of the Sea
will doubtlessly resolve a number of important issues, it will
also raise others. The adherence by the United States to a
multilateral convention codifying the law of the sea will have
a marked impact on the relations of the coastal states, both
among themselves and between those states and the federal
government. Questions concerning boundary lines and the
concomitant jurisdiction over natural resources are among
the salient legal issues which will arise under the new regime
of the sea.
The application of the current three-mile standard re-
sults in the formation of a series of enclaves of international
waters surrounded by the territorial seas of Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, and Alabama, as illustrated by the shaded areas on
Figure 1. Measuring seaward three miles from the coast and
landward the same distance from the barrier islands which
mark the southern edge of the Mississippi Sound-a long,
narrow inlet connecting the interior waters of Mississippi,
such as Biloxi and Pascagoula Bays, with the Gulf of Mexico
-leaves an intermittent strip of "high seas" in water whose
maximum depth is barely eighteen feet. The principles of ad-
jacency and acquiescence, recognized as operational rules in
the delimitation of boundaries, imply the elimination of
these enclaved stretches of international waters.'
In 1960, the United States Supreme Court issued a deci-
sion in a suit brought by the United States against the five
Gulf Coast states relative to their jurisdiction over sub-
merged lands.9 In anticipation of future suits, the Supreme
Court retained jurisdiction over the case.10 On October 31,
1979, the State of Mississippi filed a motion with the United
States Supreme Court (hereinafter referred to as the Missis-
sippi Boundary case) asking that it declare that
8. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF OCEANS 375-76 (1962).
9. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960), final decree, 364 U.S. 502
(1960).
10. Louisiana, 363 U.S. at 84.
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[tihe coastline of Mississippi is the line of ordinary low water along
the seaward side of the chain of islands marking the outer limit of
the inland waters of the Mississippi Sound, this being the baseline
from which the three-mile marginal belt into the Gulf of Mexico is
measured."
In January, 1980, the Department of Justice submitted a
cross-motion to the effect that Mississippi be limited to a
maritime zone measured three miles from the shore and an
equal distance from each of the fringing islands. 2 On Febru-
ary 21, 1980, the State of Alabama also requested a supple-
mental decree analogous to that sought by Mississippi. 3 The
ensuing discussion focuses on the role of international law in
the delimitation of Mississippi's maritime boundary, but the
same principles apply as well to other coastal states. The
standards formulated and applied in the Mississippi Bound-
ary case will have considerable precedential import for Alas-
kan waters, where the potential for economic development is
astronomical in comparison with that of the Sound.
Until the acceptance of the new convention on the law of
the sea prepared by UNCLOS III, international custom per-
mits a state to lay a claim to coastal waters beyond a dis-
tance of three miles, provided that the twin tests of adjacen-
cy and acquiescence are met." The test of adjacency is geo-
graphical in nature and requires in this instance that the
State of Mississippi establish the character of the Sound as a
body of water different in its geomorphology from the Gulf
of Mexico. In other words, the state must show through data
on salinity and temperature that the Sound qualifies for the
legal categorization of internal waters from which the belt of
territorial sea should be measured. Fed by coastal rivers, the
Sound's level of salinity is measurably less than that of the
Gulf, making possible the shrimp industry; and temperature
readings reflect a marked and consistent variation. 5 In envi-
11. Motion by the State of Mississippi for entry of Supplemental Decree at 4,
United States v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253 (1980) [hereinafter cited at Mississippi
Boundary Casel
12. Cross-Motion For Entry of Supplemental Decree, Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253
(1980).
13. Motion by the State of Alabama for Entry of Supplemental Decree, Louisi-
ana, 446 U.S. 253 (1980).
14. S. JONES, BOUNDARY-MAKING. 146 (1945); 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION 266, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SEB. A/ADD. 1 (1956).
15. MissIssIPPi MARINE CONVERVATION COMM., COOPERATIVE GULF OF MExIcO Es-
TUARINE INVENTORY AND STUDY 38-41 (J. Christmas ed. 1973).
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ronmental terms, the Sound is an area of transition between
fresh and salt water and consequently possesses a unique
character setting it apart from the high seas of the Gulf.
Related to the standard of adjacency is the putative as-
sumption that the Sound meets the geometric criteria for a
legal bay as opposed to a mere indentation of the coastline.
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,
which the United States ratified in 1961 after it had been
negotiated as part of the proceedings of UNCLOS I, stipulat-
ed two mathematical tests for identifying a legal bay.16 As
illustrated in Figure 21? the closing line across the mouth of
the proposed bay may not exceed twenty-four miles. Second-
ly, a semicircle drawn with the closing line as its diameter
must not encompass an area greater than the bay itself, in-
cluding islands." The Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, as well
as the Long Island Sound meet both standards. The Missis-
sippi Sound does not. The Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone does admit to an exception to geometry
whenever a state exercises its sovereignty over an historic
bay, i.e., a body of water long recognized by the international
community as being part of its national territory. Ultimate-
ly, it is the historical record demonstrating the exercise of
governmental powers and the acquiescence of other states to
this authority which provide the most convincing proof of
sovereign jurisdiction.
Historic Bays
The principle of acquiescence acknowledges the prescrip-
tive rights of a state over bodies of water failing to meet ei-
ther the maximum closing line distance of twenty-four miles
or the semi-circle test. Such historic waters are "waters over
which the coastal State, contrary to the generally applicable
rules of international law, clearly, effectively, continuously,
and over a substantial period of time exercises sovereign
rights with the acquiescence of the community of States."'19
16. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
17. Adapted from U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Pub. No. 8764, LAW OF THE SEA CONFER-
ENCE 10 (1974).
18. J. PRESCOTr. THE POLnIcAL GEOGRAPHY OF OCEANS 51-65 (1975).
19. L BoucHEZ. THE REGIMES OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 281 (1964).
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MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW (Vol, 2:239
INTERNATIONAL LAW
United States courts have required the satisfaction of three
historical criteria before allowing the application of the doc-
trine of acquiescence: the coastal state must have asserted a
claim to the bay in question, it must continually maintain
that claim through the exercise of sovereign rights, and oth-
er states must recognize the prerogatives of the claimant."
An overview of the legal history of the Mississippi Sound in-
dicates compliance on all three points.
Both federal and state archival holdings reflect a con-
tinuous record of established jurisdiction founded on cession
and occupation over the Mississippi Sound. Although in 1803
the United States acquired, inter alia, French rights to West
Florida-the coastal region between New Orleans and the
Apalachicola River, Spain disputed the American claim and
continued to exercise de facto governance over much of the
province, asserting that, in the words of Secretary of State
John Quincy Adams, the "whole circumference of the Gulf of
Mexico was hers."'" The conclusion of the Transcontinental
Treaty of February 22, 1819, with Spain resolved the issue in
favor of the United States,22 on whom devolved the rights of
the former colonial powers in the area. The "circumference
of the Gulf of Mexico" became United States territory and
with it the Mississippi Sound.23
The third article of the Transcontinental Treaty stipu-
lated the official character of a map of the United States
drawn in 1816 and revised two years later by John Melish, a
Philadelphia cartographer." "Melishe's [sic] map," as re-
ferred to in the treaty, provided a definitive basis for delim-
iting the boundaries between the two signatories. The "treaty
map" is a cartographic statement defining the extent of the
United States, and it depicts the Gulf of Mexico as the open
20. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 189 (1975); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v.
Island Airlines, 235 F. Supp. 990 (D. Hawaii 1964).
21. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, 4 FOREIGN RELATIONS 471 (1834).
22. Transcontinental Treaty, February 22, 1819 United States-Spain, 8 STAT.
252, T.I.A.S. No 327. For a diplomatic history of the Transcontinental Treaty see P.
BRooKS, DIPLOMACY AND THE BORDER-LANDS, 1819 (1939).
23. In 1565, Philip II, King of Spain, fixed the visual horizon as the maritime
boundary of his possessions.. See H. CROKER, THE EXTENT OF THE MARGINAL SEA 622
(1919).
24. TRANSCONTINENTAL TREATY, FEBRUARY 22, 1819, UNITED STATES-SPAIN, ART.
III, 8 STAT. 252, T.I.A.S. No. 327 at 6.
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sea south of the islands fringing the Mississippi coast."9 A
large-scale map of Mississippi prepared by Melish and ac-
cepted by Congress in 1819 clearly differentiates between
what is now described as the Mississippi Sound and the Gulf
of Mexico.26 In sum, both official documents and maps indi-
cate that the Mississippi Sound was a part of West Florida
as established by colonial powers and acquired by the United
States.
In an "Act to enable the people of the western part of
the Mississippi territory to form a constitution and state
government" Congress directed that the southern boundary
of the new state should include "all islands within six
leagues of the shore. ' 27 When Mississippi became a state on
August 15, 1817, it brought with it a maritime zone extending
approximately eighteen miles seaward. By comparison, it is
notable that the Supreme Court has subsequently recognized
nine miles as the counterpart distance for Texas and Flor-
ida.28 Conversely, the Supreme Court has denied the validity
of the historic claim of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi
by insisting on the application of the three-mile rule to each
of these states.29
The delimitation of a territorial sea three miles in
breadth for Mississippi and her two neighbors has not met
with unanimity on the United States Supreme Court. Repre-
senting the dissenting point of view in the case Alabama v.
Texas, 30 Justice William 0. Douglas pointed out that Texas
25. J. MELISH, MAP OF THE UNITED STATES, (January 1, 1818) (available in Nation-
al Archives, Cartographic Branch, Record Group 11).
26. J. MELISH, MAP OF Mississippi, (September 10, 1819) (available in National
Archives, Cartographic Branch, Special List No. 29, Entry 440). The earliest record-
ed cartographic use of the designation "Mississippi Sound" is by the U.S. COAST SUR-
VEY in SKETcH H: Section 8 (1846-51), (available in the William David McCain
Graduate Library, University of Southern Mississippi). Prior to the 1840's, the
Sound was referred to as "Pascagoula Bay." See A. FINLEY, Mississippi, (1830), re-
printed in The Natchez Trace Hearings Before the House Comm. on Roads, 73d
Cong. 2d Sess. (1934); see also, H. TANNER, A NEW MAP OF MISSISSIPPI, (183), reprinted
in Natchez Trace Parkway Survey: Letter of the Secy. Qf the Interior to the Senate
Comm. on Public Lands, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., (1941).
27. Mississippi Enabling Act (1817), 3 Stat. 348. A "league" as referred to in
this context equals three miles.
28. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 64 (1960); United States v. Florida,
363 U.S. 121, 129 (1960).
29. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960), final decree, 354 U.S. 502 (1960).
30. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1953).
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had received an advantage denied to other states in the dis-
position of the national domain because of the assignment to
it of a territorial sea extending nine miles from the shore-
line.3 1 Nevertheless, the doctrine of the equality of states ap-
plies only to the terms upon which they were admitted to the
Union and not to specific legal actions falling within the pur-
view of federal legislative or executive authority. The word
"person" in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
is not interpreted to include the several states.2 In light of
these cases, official United States policy itself reflects some
ambiguity with respect to the territorial sea. A Department
of State background paper stresses that "the United States
has maintained that three miles is the maximum breadth
recognized under international law. 3 Supreme Court deci-
sions respecting the maritime boundaries of Florida and Tex-
as3' run counter to this assertion, as does the Submerged
Lands Act in which Congress recognized historic claims ex-
tending beyond three miles. 5
Legislative imprecision accounts for the Supreme
Court's differing evaluations of the historical record. The
language used by Congress in authorizing Louisiana's admis-
sion to the Union in 1812 merely described the state as "in-
cluding all islands within three leagues of the coast."3 The
judicial interpretation placed on this phraseology was that
Louisiana did indeed possess the islands but not the inter-
vening waters.3 7 Since the congressional delimitation of Mis-
sissippi five years later employed similar language and made
no reference to jurisdiction over waters surrounding the bar-
rier islands," the judicial opinion rendered in Louisiana's
boundary case might also apply to Mississippi.
The preamble to the first constitution of Mississippi
31. Id at 281-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
32. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966).
33. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, stpra note 17, at 2. For a present-day examination of
this policy see Feldman & Colson, The Maritime Boundaries qf the United States, 75
AM. J. INrL L. 729 (1981).
34. Louisiana, 363 U.S. at 64; Florida, 363 U.S. at 124.
35. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, Pub L, No. 31 § 2,67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. § 1312
(1976).
36. Louisiana Enabling Act (1812), 2 Stat. 701.
37. Louisiana, 363 U.S. at 68.
38. Mississippi Enabling Act, supra note 27.
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(August 15, 1817) did make reference to all islands situated
within six leagues of the coast, 9 and the Mississippi Code, in
defining the boundaries of counties further stipulated that
Jackson, Harrison and Hancock
[sihall, respectively, have and possess jurisdiction and extend to the
southern boundary of the State, within in the space embraced by ex-
tending their boundary lines which strike the Gulf of Mexico, or the
inlets thereto, on a continuous direct course to the southern bound-
ary of the State, including all islands that may lie within the limits
thus defined."
The uninterrupted jurisdiction of the three coastal coun-
ties over the Mississippi Sound is depicted on a 1978 map
prepared by the Geological Survey of the Department of the
Interior." Notably, the Department of Justice has advised
the State of Mississippi that the first nautical chart showing
enclaved areas of high seas within the Mississippi Sound was
published by the National Ocean Survey of the Department
of Commerce as early as August 10, 1970. ' The discrepancy
in maps produced by federal agencies presents an unusual
difficulty for the state.
The prescriptive rights of Mississippi to the Sound de-
rive, in part, from a textual review of both congressional and
executive documents. These documents sustain the view that
federal authority regarded Mississippi's maritime boundary
as enclosing the barrier islands. A Senate resolution of De-
cember 4, 1845, requested the President to consider the
"practicality and utility of a fort or forts on Ship Island, on
the coast of Mississippi, with a view to the protection of said
coast."43 President James K. Polk approved, and in a message
to the Senate (May 19, 1846) wrote,
I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of War, in answer to
a resolution of the Senate of the 4th of December last .... "with
respect to the practicality and utility of a fort or forts on Ship [I]s-
39. Miss CONST., preamble (1817).
40. MIss. CODE I 2, art. 2 (1857).
41. U.S. DEPr. OF INTERIOR, GEoLOGiCAL SURVEY, MIssISSIPPI (1972, 1978).
42. United States' Answers to Mississippi's First Set of Interrogatories and Re-
quest for Production at 17, Louisian, 363 U.S. 1 [hereimafter cited as First Set cf
Interrogatories].
43. Letter from WJL Marcy to James K. Polk (May 18, 1846) reprinted in S.
Doc. No. 352 at 1 (1845).
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land on the coast of Mississippi with a view to the protection of said
coast.""
On August 28, 1847, the Secretary of the Treasury, Rob-
ert J. Walker, endorsed, in a letter to the President, the rec-
ommendations of the Secretary of War and the Commission-
er of the General Land Office for the fortification of "certain
portions of islands in the Gulf of Mexico within the limits of
the states of Alabama and Mississippi," and the President
promptly concurred.45
On March 3, 1857, Congress appropriated $100,000 "for
the fortification of Ship Island, coast of Mississippi.' 6 Subse-
quent appropriations adhered to the same formulation by
placing "Coast of Mississippi" in apposition to "Ship Is-
land." 7 "An act to cede to the United States jurisdictions
over a certain Island in the Gulf of Mexico on the Coast of
Mississippi known as Ship Island", passed by the Mississippi
legislature on November 15, 1858, stipulated that the state
would exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal authori-
ties in civil and criminal matters.8 From the perspective of
the state of Mississippi as well as that of the United States
Congress, Ship Island marked the southern boundary of Mis-
sissippi.
Variations in terminology did begin to appear toward
the end of the nineteenth century. In 1888, Congress referred
to Ship Island as being in the Gulf of Mexico 9 rather than on
the coast of Mississippi. The implication that Ship Island is
surrounded by the high seas, as opposed to being bounded on
the north by inland waters, received further support on Feb-
ruary 15, 1927, when President Calvin Coolidge signed an ex-
ecutive order entitled "Ship Island Military Reservation lo-
44. Message from James K. Polk to the Senate of the United States (May 19,
1846) reprinted in S. Doe. No. 352 at 1 (1845).
45. Executive Order of James K. Polk (August 30, 1847) (available at National
Archives, Legislation and Natural Resources Branch, Record Group 49).
46. An Act Making Appropriations for Fortifications and Other Works of De-
fense of 1858, 11 Stat. 191, 192.
47. An Act Making Approprations for Fortifications and Other Works of De-
fense of 1862, 12 Stat. 341, 343; an Act Making Appropriations for Fortifications and
Other Works of Defense of 1863, 12 Stat. 654, 655.
48. An Act to Cede to the United States Jurisdiction over a certain Island in the
Gulf of Mexico on the coast of Mississippi known as Ship Island, 1858 Miss. LAws 49.
49. An act to Authorize the Removal of the Quarantine Station from Ship Is-
land, Mississippi, 25 Stat. 43 (1888).
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cated off the coast of Mississippi."50 Notwithstanding this
phraseology, attached to the order was a map which depicted
the Gulf of Mexico as beginning on the southern shore of the
Island. In a record of the terms of the sale of Ship Island by
the Secretary of War to the Joe Graham Post of the Ameri-
can Legion (September 15, 1933), the Office of the Quarter-
master General identified the property as "situate and being
in the County of Harrison, State of Mississippi."'" As the
Geological Survey map indicates, 2 this interpretation of the
jurisdiction of the coastal counties obtained until March 7,
1970, when the Committee on the Delimitation of the United
States Coastline, a body charged with the responsibility of
coordinating boundary policies of involved federal agencies,
approved of a nautical chart of the Sound. 3 Subsequent
charts of the National Ocean Survey, Department of Com-
merce, showed four inliers or enclaved areas of high seas in
the Sound.
Baselines. Normal and Straight
The geographical argument of adjacency and the histori-
cal one of acquiescence notwithstanding, the policy of the
United States remains that of a precise application of the
three-mile rule, with the exceptions specified for Florida and
Texas. As codified in the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone (April 29, 1958)) the law of the sea
grants to the United States and the other thirty-six treaty
partners the option of measuring the territorial sea from ei-
ther the low-water line of the coast or from a straight base-
line established to follow the general direction of the coast-
line. Of particular relevance to Mississippi is Article IV:
In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or if
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity,
the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be
50. Executive Order of Calvin Coolidge (February 15, 1927) (available at Nation-
al Archives, Army and Navy Branch, Record Group 153).
51. Memorandum from the office of the Quartermaster General to the Judge
Advocate General, U.S. Army (March 21, 1938) (available at National Archives,
Army and Navy Branch, Record Group 153).
52. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, supra note 41.
53. Cross-Motion, supra note 9; First Set of Interrogatories, supra note 42, at 16.




employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea is measured."
The decision as to whether or not to apply the straight
baseline method is judgmental and often rests more on po-
litical rather than international legal considerations. The
United States wishes to set an example of self-restraint in
the use of straight baselines so as to encourage other states
to do the same. The mere extension of the territorial sea
from three to twelve miles, as proposed by UNCLOS III,
would enclose some three million square miles of ocean with-
in national domains. As a result, strategic straits, such as
those of Gibraltar and Hormuz, would be subject to regula-
tions by authorities of coastal states.56 Nevertheless, federal
recognition of the principles of adjacency and acquiescence in
the case of the Mississippi Sound would hardly constitute an
exception to national policy. In a 1906 decision, the United
States Supreme Court stated that "Mississippi's mainland
borders on the Mississippi Sound. This is an enclosed arm of
the sea, wholly within the United States, and formed by a
chain of large islands, extending westward from Mobile, Ala-
bama, to Cat Island. ' '57 Accordingly, a series of straight base-
lines linking the barrier islands would provide a reasonable
delimitation of the State's seaward boundary. Such a delimi-
tation has not been the case. In the Louisiana Boundary case
(1969) the Supreme Court upheld a narrow interpretation of
the territorial sea.5" Subsequent decisions refined the three-
mile rule so that its application requires the measurement of
the prescribed distance from the mean lower low water mark
of the mainland shore. 9 The thrust of judicial opinion contin-
ues to support this interpretation with the exception that the
State of California may measure from jetties or other perma-
nent harbor works," while the State of Texas may not."
Underlying the Supreme Court's shift from a flexible
view of the territorial sea in 1906, to the more restrictive
55. &d
56. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, Pub. No. 7849, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 6 (1965).
57. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 48 (1906).
58. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969).
59. United States v. California, 382 U.S. 448 (1966); United States v. California,
447 U.S. 1 (1980).
60. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 175 (1965).
61. United States v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155 (1967).
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view expressed in the Louisiana Boundary case is the invoca-
tion of the doctrine of the political question. In a key decision
on California's maritime boundary, the Supreme Court ruled
in 1947 that federal agencies may assert national dominion,
as opposed to the dominion of the states, over marginal wa-
ters beyond the three-mile limit. 2 In doing so, the Court im-
plicitly set aside a long standing constitutional doctrine for-
mulated in the case of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan in 1845: "The
shores of navigable waters and the soil under them, were not
granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were
reserved to the States respectively. '6 3 The implications of the
reversal of Pollard became apparent in 1953, when Congress
passed the Submerged Lands Act granting jurisdiction to the
federal government over the seabed and resources lying sea-
ward of the maritime boundaries of the several states.64 The
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this grant
in a decision on a boundary suit argued jointly by Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama, but it retained jurisdiction in the
matter with the result that Mississippi could request a sup-
plemental motion in 1979.5
Taken against a constitutional background of the treaty
and war powers, the California and Louisiana decisions leave
little doubt that the option of whether or not to draw
straight baselines is open only to federal authorities. The
structure established to implement national policy on mari-
time boundaries is the Committee on the Delimitation of the
United States Coastline, more commonly known as the Base-
line Committee. Since its founding as an ad hoc working
group in 1970, the committee has grown in stature and today
both reviews and gives prepublication approval to nautical
charts prepared by the National Ocean Survey of the Depart-
ment of Commerce. In addition to the Department of Com-
merce, members of the Committee are drawn from the De-
partments of Defense, Interior (Bureau of Land Manage-
ment), Justice, and Treasury (Coast Guard); meetings are
chaired by a representative of the Department of State."6
62. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
63. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
64. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, supra note 35, 43 U.S.C. § 1312.
65. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 82 (1960), fina decree 364 U.S. 502, 504 (1960).
66. First Set of Interrogatories, supra note 42, at 5.
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The minutes of the Committee reveal that it concerns
itself with questions of policy as well as changes in land
forms brought about by erosion or accretion. Not having the
official status of a statutory body the Committee does not
hold hearings, nor does it publish announcements and regu-
lations in the Federal Register,67 as is required of federal
agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act.68 Affected
parties-both public and private-receive notification of the
Committee's decisions through the commercial sale of Na-
tional Ocean Survey charts. For example, the chart of the
"Mississippi Sound and Approaches" 9 has a reissuance cycle
of twelve months. As with other charts, the boundaries ap-
proved by the Baseline Committee and depicted on each new
edition reflect changes in topography, such as the separation
of Ship Island because of hurricane Camille. The result is a
definitive statement which takes legal precedence over all
other maps, including those of the Coast Guard. The absence
of published regulations does unfortunately create a situa-
tion in which affected parties, both foreign and domestic, are
left to their own devices in ascertaining the principles under-
girding the delimitation of the coastal limits of the United
States."0
67. OFFICES OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL
1981/82, Appendix F (1981).
68. Administrative Procedure Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
69. National Ocean Survey Chart No. 11373.
70. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as codified in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(1976) reads in part as follows:
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as
follows:
(1) Each agency shall se parately state and currently publish in the
Federal Register for the guidance of the public-
(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the
established placed at which, the employees (and in the case of a
uniformed service, the members) from whom, and the methods
whereby, the public may obtain information, make submittals or
requests, or obtain decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which
its functions are channeled and determined, including the nature
and requirements of all formal and informal procedures avail-able;(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the
places at which forms may be obtained, and instructions as to
the scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as au-
thorized by law, and statments of general policy or interpreta-
tions of general applicability formulated and adopted by the
agency, and
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In terms of both treaty law and international custom,
three arguments emerge which call into question the policy
of the United States, as interpreted by the Baseline Commit-
tee, to create high seas enclaves in the Mississippi Sound.
The first of these centers on the economic and social needs of
the coastal population. These considerations were paramount
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case heard by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1951.11 The fifteen-member
ICJ is an organ of the United Nations. The ICJ ruled in favor
of Norway in what may be a major decision for the resolu-
tion of the Mississippi Boundary case. On the basis of ex ae-
quo et bono72 the Court decided that historical and economic
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice
of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be re-
quired to resort to or be adversely affected by, a matter re-
quired to be published in the Federal Register and not so pub-
lished. For the purpose of this paragraph, matter reasonably
available to the class of persons affected thereby is deemed pub-
lished in the Federal Register when incorporated by reference
therein with the approval of the Director of the Federal Regis-
ter.
The primary questions for consideration is whether or not the Baseline Com-
mittee is governed by these provisions. The wording of the statute would seem to
indicate that only if the Committee is deemed to be an "agency" would these statu-
tory provisions be applicable. An interpretation of the APA's definition of "agency"
was put forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in the case of Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court
stated that
[ulnder the APA, an agency is any authority of the Government of the
United States, whether or not it is within or sub)ect to review by an-
other agency. The statutory definition of "agency' is not entirely clear,
but the APA apparently confers agency status on any administative
unit with substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific
functions. While the primary purpose of the APA is to regulate the
processes of rule making and adjudication, administrative entities that
perform neither function are nevertheless agencies...
The APA would seem to set out the standards for minimum notice required for
due process purposes. Thus, serious questions could arise from any Baseline Com-
mittee decision which had the effect of removing territory from a state's jurisdic-
tion. This is of acute importance in regard to the leasing of off-shore oil and gas
drilling rights. While a state's loss of property rights as a result of the committee's
decision is not subject to a due process attack, see text accompanying note 32 supra,
it is open to debate whether a lessee holding under the state might advance such a
claim. On the other hand, it is possible that the argument can be made that such
decisions fall within the category of foreign affairs and hence the APA provisions
are not applicable. See Jensen v. National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA), 512
F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1975).
71. United Kingdom v. Norway, 1951 I.C.J. 130-33. [hereinafter cited as the
Fisheries case.
72. "According to equity and good conscience."
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circumstances justified the use of straight baselines to ex-
tend territorial waters beyond the traditional three miles. A
research bulletin issued by the geographer of the Depart-
ment of State lent credence to this doctrine by acknowledg-
ing those instances in which "the margins of the sea are not
well-defined in the sense that the economic regime of a state
encompasses nearby off shore islands and water passages
which separate them from the mainland and from each oth-
er. ' 73 While the Mississippi Sound was not specifically men-
tioned, its setting suggests that the foregoing principle is ap-
plicable. Officially, the United States has never accepted the
judgment in the Fisheries case without some qualification,
yet the Department of Justice replied to an interrogatory
from the State of Mississippi in 1980 that "some aspects" of
the ICJ's judgment may be relevant to the Sound.74
By 1973 some sixty governments had availed themselves
of the Norwegian precedent and drawn baselines connecting
the islands which screened their coasts." Among these gov-
ernments was that of the United Kingdom, which in 1964
drew baselines along the Atlantic Coast of Scotland.6 By this
Order in Council the British government acknowledged that
changes in international law had validated the position taken
thirteen years earlier by Norway. Contemporary practice in-
dicates that islands connected by baselines should be situated
less than twenty-four and more than twelve miles from the
coast.7 The Mississippi Sound meets this requirement, and
the State is in a position to advance the optional argument
developed in the Fisheries case by introducing data on the
social and economic needs of the coastal population. The de-
velopment of international law since Would War II, especial-
ly in the field of human rights, is demonstrative of the trend
to give credence to extra-legal concerns. Likewise, human
needs play a major role in determining the rights and obliga-
73. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, Pub. No. 7849, supra note 56, at 12.
74. United States' Answer to Mississippi's Second Set of Interrogatories and
Request for Production at 19, Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253.
75. U.S. DEP'r OF STATE. ISLANDS, REGS-3 at 21-23 (R. Hodgson 1973).
76. E. Brown, Maritime Zones, in 3 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 282
(R. Churchill, K. Simmonds & J. Welch ed. 1973).
77. D. BOWETr, THE LEGAL REGIME OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-23
(1979).
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tions of governments under the Draft Convention on the Law
of the Sea now under consideration by UNCLOS 111.1 8
A second argument against the reluctance of the United
States to avail itself of the treaty right to use straight base-
lines is that such a policy is ill-suited to the legal regime of
the seas most likely to emerge from UNCLOS III. The new
convention will doubtless establish twelve miles as the lawful
breadth of territorial waters. When that occurs, not only will
the enclaved areas of high seas in the Mississippi Sound dis-
appear, but the state's jurisdiction will also be extended over
the Gulf of Mexico for a distance twelve miles southward of
the barrier islands. In the interest of federal-state relations
as they will develop within the framework of the proposed
territorial waters limit, the elimination of the present en-
claves through the drawing of a straight baseline along the
barrier islands of the Sound would facilitate joint planning
for economic development and conservation.
The third argument derives from considerations of di-
plomacy in linking national and international affairs. During
UNCLOS I (1958) the United States delegation endeavored
without success to gain support for a compromise which
would have decreed a six-mile breadth for the territorial
sea. 9 In 1974, during the course of UNCLOS III, the United
States indicated a willingness to accept twelve miles as the
breadth for territorial seas, as long as the right of innocent
passage was guaranteed by all treaty signatories. 0 To adhere
to the three-mile rule in terms of domestic law while simul-
taneously endorsing a standard of twelve miles at the United
Nations, bespeaks a lack of coordination in federal policy.
The resultant difficulties will redound to the disadvantage of
government at all levels.
The Seabed Issue
Closely related to the question of enclaves in the Missis-
sippi Sound are the negotiations between Mississippi and
Louisiana over the apportionment of the outer continental
78. OFFICIAL- RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNCLOS, supra note 5, at 51. Article 140
stipulates that the resources of the high seas should benefit all mankind and that
the needs of new states should receive special consideration.
79. 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS UNCLOS, mspra note 4, at 253.
80. U.S. DEP"t OF STATE, Pub. No. 8764, supra note 17, at 2.
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shelf adjacent to their respective coasts. The expression
"continental shelf" is subject to differing interpretations in
that lawyers and political scientists engaged in delimiting a
boundary81 would use it in a more general sense than would
biologists and engineers conducting research on the subma-
rine extension of a continent.8 2 Reflecting a legal rather than
a strictly geological perspective, the participating govern-
ments in UNCLOS III have defined the continental shelf of a
littoral state as "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of
the continental margin."'  The Coastal Zone Management
Act" called upon Mississippi and other coastal states to for-
mulate a developmental plan taking into account economic,
recreational, and environmental factors. As an incentive for
the achievement of this legislated goal, the Act created the
Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP), under which the in-
volved states would receive a federal grant calculated on a
ratio based on the amount of continental shelf acreage adja-
cent to the state in question vis-A-vis that leased by the fed-
eral government."5
The division of the seabed south of Mississippi's fringing
islands and east of Louisiana's Chandeleur Islands is now at
issue.8" A 1906 Supreme Court decision had established the
Mississippi-Louisiana seaward boundary based on the Thal-
weg, i.e., most navigable channel, of the Pearl River. 7 The
CEIP necessitated an extension of this boundary to cover the
outer continental shelf. To do so required a practical applica-
tion of the principle of federalism through the balancing of
the national interest with the diverse needs of the states. 8
81. Orlin, Offshore Boundaries, 3 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INrL LJ. 89 (1975).
82. Hodgson & Smith, The Informal Single Negotiating Tet, 3 OCEAN DEVELOP-
MENT & INrL LJ. 254 (1976).
83. OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNCLOS, supra note 5, at 31.
84. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, § 308, 86 Stat.
1280, as amended by Coastal Zone Management Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
370, § 7, 90 Stat 1019 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976).
85. Id.
86. Charney, The Delimitation of Lateral Seaward Boundaries Between States
in a Domestic Context, 75 AM. J. INTL L. 55 (1981).
87. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. at 50-52.
88. Hildreth, The Operation of the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act as
Amended, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 211 (1977).
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Modern international law recognizes three basic meth-
ods of delimiting the lateral seaward boundaries of adjacent
states. 9 The first is a straightforward extension of the land
boundary as was done by Congress in the case of Mississip-
pi's border with Alabama. The second involves establishing
an imaginary line representing the general direction of the
coast and then drawing the seaward boundary perpendicular
to that line. The third-and least employed-requires the
fixing of a reference point at sea equidistant from the near-
est headlands of adjacent states. The boundary line will then
connect the reference point to the end of the land frontier.
The Coastal Zone Management Act does not stipulate a
particular method of boundary delimitation beyond making
reference to the Convention of the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone.9" The Convention itself offers little assistance,
for after endorsing the principle of equidistance as the pre-
ferred means of dividing the seabed between neighboring
states, it then authorizes an exception to the rule of parity
whenever "it is necessary by reason of historic title or other
special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the
two states in a way which is at variance with this provi-
sion." 91 In a similar vein, the counterpart article in the pro-
posed Draft Convention under consideration by UNCLOS III
broadens the exception by specifying that an agreement be-
tween states with opposite or adjacent coasts ". . . shall be in
accordance with equitable principles, employing the median
or equidistant line, where appropriate, and taking account of
all circumstances prevailing in the area concerned.
92
References in international law to "special circum-
stances" or to "all circumstances prevailing in the area con-
cerned" offer little assistance to those engaged in boundary
delimitation. The meaning of these expressions may lie in
precedential cases which provide guidelines for the applica-
tion of treaty norms. There are two cases, the first of which
was decided by the ICJ and the second by the ad hoc arbitral
89. Hodgson & Cooper, The Technical Delimitation of a Modern Equidistant
Boundary, 3 OCEAN DEv. AND IN'rL L.J. 362 (1976).
90. Coastal Zone Management Amendments of 1976, supra note 84, 16 U.S.C.
§1456a(b)(4)(B)(ii).
91. CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE, supra note 16, at
1610.
92. OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNCLOS, supra note 5, at 34.
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tribunal. The former dealt with the North Sea and the latter
with the English Channel.
In 1969, the ICJ formulated a far-reaching judgment in
the North Sea Continental Shelf case to the effect that the
rule of equidistance-the maxim that every point on a
boundary line must be of equal distance from the nearest
headland in each of the adjoining states-was only one of
several standards applicable to the delimitation of seaward
frontiers. 3 Equity, historical claims, and special circum-
stances in the form of islands offset a rigid reliance on equi-
distance in the apportionment of the seabed. Had the ICJ ac-
knowledged only the equidistance principle, West Germany's
land frontier with the Netherlands would have been extended
seaward so that every benchmark would be equidistant from
the land masses of the two states. Repeating the same proce-
dure regarding the Danish-West German frontier would have
had the result of granting most of the North Sea continental
shelf to Denmark and the Netherlands, leaving West Ger-
many with only a narrow slice of the seabed. The three states
agreed, within the framework of the decision of the ICJ, to
an equitable division of the seabed which awarded West Ger-
many substantially more of the continental shelf than a rigid
application of the mathematical principle of equidistance
would have allowed.
9 4
The situation in which Mississippi finds itself is analo-
gous to that of West Germany. Were equidistance to be the
sole guideline in delimiting the seaward boundaries of the
Gulf Coast states, Alabama and Louisiana would absorb
most of the seabed, and Mississippi would possess only a
small triangle of the continental shelf adjacent to its territo-
rial waters. 95 Applying the approach taken with respect to
the North Sea requires taking cognizance of considerations of
equity and history, which in turn dictate that Mississippi
should have a larger submarine area for CEIP purposes than
the rule of equidistance by itself would permit.
The second case offering a relevant precedent for the de-
93. Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark/Netherlands, 1969 I.CJ., reprint-
ed in 8 Is'rL LEGAL MATERIALS 340 (1969).
94. U. S. DEPT. OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 10. NORTH SEA CONINIENTAL
SHELF BOUNDARIES (1974).
95. Charney, supra note 86, at 54.
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limitation of Mississippi's continental shelf was the division
of the seabed of the English Channel between France and the
United Kingdom. 6 In 1977, the two governments accepted the
principle of arbitration and called upon a specially selected
court to resolve their dispute over a submarine boundary.
After reviewing the arguments of both parties, the court con-
cluded that both customary and treaty law necessitated a di-
vision of the Channel seabed along a median line running
from one end of the strait to the other. In reaching its deci-
sion the court ruled that the position of the British islands of
Guernsey and Jersey off the French coast did not justify a
distortion of the boundary, i.e., a deviation from the median
line. According to the arbitral award, the islands possessed a
continental shelf limited in breadth to twelve miles, which
makes their seabed boundaries enclaves within those of
France.9 7 The configuration of the coast, the geological set-
ting, and a ratio between the extent of the shelf and the
length of the respective national coastlines determined the
outcome of the arbitration. The utilization of a standard of
proportionality relating a state's share of the continental
shelf to its coastline derived in part from the North Sea judg-
ment of the ICJ 9
The Anglo-French arbitration provides a precedent
which helps to define the legal significance of the marshland
at the entrance to the Mississippi River and therefore to
guide the drawing of a CEIP boundary between Louisiana
and Mississippi. The question of whether or not the delta
formed by the mouth of the Mississippi is a "special circum-
stance" in the sense of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone, i.e., the equivalent of an island or a
peninsula, is fundamental. If indeed the delta area is a spe-
cial circumstance, it has, like the Channel Islands of the
United Kingdom, little effect on the boundary. The legal
coastline of Louisiana would then run southward from the
entrance to the Pearl River. Conversely, should this delta
96. DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (United Kingdon v. France),
H.M.S.O. Cmnd. 7438 (1978) reprinted in 18 INTL LEGAL MATERIALS 397 (1979).
97. 1&
98. Bowrr, supra note 77, at 163.
99. U. S. DEP~t OF COMMERCE, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI/ LOUISIANA
COASTAL ENERGY IMPACT PROGRAM DELIMITATION LINE 9 (R. Knecht 1979).
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achieve the status of being an integral part of the mainland
rather than an alluvial fan, the Mississippi-Louisiana bound-
ary extension would proceed in a southeasterly direction
from its present terminus south of Ship Island.
Under the auspices of the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration of the Department of Commerce, a
committee of legal and scientific experts examined the prob-
lem of dividing the continental shelf between Mississippi and
Louisiana, and they submitted a report recommending that
the birdfoot delta where the Mississippi River enters the
Gulf of Mexico be considered a special circumstance and
therefore of limited effect.' The consultants also made ref-
erence to the North Sea Continental Shelf case and drew a
comparison between the concave coastline of West Germany
and of Mississippi. Their report endorses the ICJ's resort to a
rule of proportionality in such an instance.101
Should the consultants' recommendations provide a ba-
sis for the interstate compact which will establish the CEIP
boundary,"2 Mississippi's frontage on the Gulf of Mexico and
its share of the seabed will increase. The state must, howev-
er, first demonstrate that the eastern reaches of Louisiana's
St. Bernard Parish are the geographical equivalent of off-
shore islands. A countervailing interpretation may well point
to the continental shelf boundary between Iran and Saudi
Arabia, which gave half effect to the Iranian island of Kharg
by drawing the boundary along a median halfway between
the baseline of the island and between the national baselines
without it.
Prospects
The questions surrounding the legal regime of Mississip-
pi's coastal zone offer a challenge to federal-state relations
in the application of the law of the sea. The viability of the
states requires that federal authorities recognize their di-
verse interests. High seas enclaves in the Mississippi Sound
do indeed manifest national policy, but one might well reflect
100. U. S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, CONSULTANTS' REPORT ON THE MISSISSIPPI/ LOUISI-
ANA DELIMITATION LINE 28 (R. Baxter, J. Charney, & H. Orlin 1979).
101. Id. at 27.
102. Christie, Coastal Energy Impact Program Boundaries Between States in a
Domestic Conte,4 75 AM J. INrL L 55 (1981).
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upon the economic needs of coastal communities, as did the
ICJ in the Fisheries case. Finally, in its efforts to delimit
both the territorial sea and the continental shelf, the State of
Mississippi may confront contradictory choices brought
about by recent developments in international law. Should
the United States sign and ratify the Convention on the Law
of the Sea drafted by UNCLOS III and thereby adopt a
twelve-mile standard for the territorial sea, the resultant ex-
pansion of Mississippi's jurisdiction south of the barrier is-
lands would require a new boundary settlement with Louisi-
ana, and the new line would follow the most navigable chan-
nel or Thalweg of the Pearl River.1 3 The rules of equity and
proportionality as enunciated in the North Sea Continental
Shelf case or in the Anglo-French agreement on the Channel
Islands do not apply to territorial waters. As matters now
stand, the historic standard of three miles does cost Missis-
sippi the enclaved areas of the Sound, yet it also allows the
apportionment of the outer continental shelf on the basis of
rules applicable to the high seas-much to Mississippi's ad-
vantage. The outcome of the Mississippi Boundary case is
crucially pivotal. The rights and interests of both Mississippi
and her citizens in the waters and the seabed lying in the
Mississippi coastal zone hinge upon the standards applied by
the United States Supreme Court.
103. The Thalweg is the middle of the main navigable channel of a river. See
Wisconsin v. Michigan 295 U.S. 455, 461 (1935).
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